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EVERY DOLLAR COUNTS: IN DEFENSE OF THE OBAMA
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S “SUPPLEMENT NOT
SUPPLANT” PROPOSAL
James S. Liebman * & Michael Mbikiwa **
INTRODUCTION
Evidence compellingly demonstrates—as Congress famously recognized in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA)1—that children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds
require more educational resources than other students.2 Yet, a half
century later, many school districts still spend less money on high-poverty
schools than on more privileged schools.3 In 2011, a study by the U.S.
Department of Education discovered that nationwide, more than forty
percent of schools eligible for Title I funding based on their high-poverty
status receive less state and local funding for instructional and other
personnel costs than non–Title I schools in the same districts at the same
grade level.4 A more recent study confirmed that more than 4.5 million
low-income students attend Title I schools that on average receive about
$1,200 less per student than non–Title I schools in the same district.5
In 1970, in an effort to prevent the availability of federal funding for
high-poverty schools from diminishing state and local funding for those
schools, Congress amended the ESEA to forbid districts to use Title I
funds to “supplant,” rather than to “supplement,” the local funds they
would otherwise have spent on Title I schools.6 Notwithstanding this
“supplement not supplant” requirement, districts often take two steps
*. Simon H. Rifkin Professor, Columbia Law School.
**. Attorney of the High Court of South Africa.
1. See Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (Supp. III)) (reauthorizing and
amending the ESEA).
2. See infra notes 15–24 and accompanying text (introducing Title I’s goal of
compensatory education).
3. Ruth Heuer & Stephanie Stullich, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Comparability of State and Local
Expenditures Among Schools Within Districts 29 (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/titlei/school-level-expenditures/school-level-expenditures.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3Q3-2ZHY].
4. Id.
5. Robert Hanna et al., Ctr. for Am. Progress, Comparable but Unequal: School
Funding Disparities 1 (2015), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/ESEAComparability-brief2.pdf [http://perma.cc/TGY5-36N8].
6. Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91230, § 109 (a), 84 Stat. 121 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.
(2012)).
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that result in the spending disparities described above: (1) letting their
most experienced and highly salaried teachers opt into schools with
more privileged students, leaving Title I schools with less experienced,
lower-salaried teachers;7 then (2) disguising how much less Title I schools
spend on instruction than more advantaged schools by omitting teacher
salaries from school-funding comparisons.8
To remedy this situation, President Barack Obama’s Department of
Education in 2016 proposed a regulation (hereinafter “the 2016
proposed regulation”) that would have explicitly required districts to
account for all aspects of local funding of schools in the course of
demonstrating their compliance with the “supplement not supplant”
requirement.9 The civil rights community supported the proposal,10 but
teacher unions and congressional Republicans vehemently opposed it
because it disrupts funding patterns favoring non–Title I schools that
benefit their constituents.11
Soon after the Obama Administration announced the proposal, the
nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) added its own
seemingly show-stopping legal objection—that the proposed regulation is
so clearly contrary to the ESEA that it may not deserve Chevron
deference.12 Indeed, the CRS contended that the proposed regulation
contravened two ESEA provisions: one prohibiting the Department from
forcing districts to equalize per-pupil spending across all schools and
another exempting teacher salaries from a provision of the Act, separate
from its “supplement not supplant” requirement, that requires
7. See Hanna et al., supra note 5, at 6 (noting that high-poverty schools “typically
employ teachers with fewer years of experience and lower salaries”).
8. See id. at 1 (“[D]istricts can compute comparability using average teacher salaries
or teacher-to-student ratios instead of actual expenditures on teacher salaries.”).
9. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Issue Paper: Supplement Not Supplant (Apr. 14, 2016), (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Dep’t of Educ., Issue Paper].
10. See Andrew Ujifusa, Civil Rights Groups to Feds: Your ESSA Rules Must Push
Equity, Disruptive or Not, Education Week (Apr. 28, 2016), http://blogs.edweek.org/
edweek/campaign-k-12/2016/04/civil_rights_groups_essa_must_push_equity.html
[http://perma.cc/P8LS-YE2H] (“30 civil rights groups . . . appear to see a lot to like in the
administration’s proposed regulations . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Obama Wants to Give Poor Schools More Money. Guess
Who’s Blocking Him., N.Y. Mag. (May 19, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2016/05/whos-blocking-obama-from-helping-poor-schools.html [http://
perma.cc/8VXF-GZBD] (discussing a “surprising . . . alliance between teachers unions and
Republicans” opposing the regulation).
12. Memorandum from Jody Feder & Rebecca Skinner, Cong. Research Serv., on the
Proposed Regulations on the Supplement, Not Supplant Provision that Applies to the Title
I-A Program Authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 6–9 (May 5,
2016) [hereinafter Feder & Skinner, Proposed Regulations Memo], http://
edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sns_and_negotiated_rulemaking_5-5-16.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G9NC-F5KQ]; see infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the
deference courts must give to reasonable administrative regulations under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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comparability of services between schools receiving and those not
receiving Title I funds.13 The day before the Obama Administration
turned over the reins to President Donald Trump, the Department of
Education announced that it was dropping its proposed “supplement not
supplant” regulation.14 Although the Department of Education offered
no explanation for doing so, legal objections by the respected CRS likely
played a role in the decision.
The CRS’s legal analysis is wrong. Far from being unworthy of
Chevron deference, the interpretation of the ESEA underlying the
Department’s 2016 proposed regulation is dictated by well-established
canons of statutory interpretation and relies on the same objective
approach to assessing the motives of local officials as a wealth of other
federal laws and regulations. More broadly, that interpretation is
appropriate—indeed imperative—to ensure high-poverty schools the
funds to which the ESEA legally entitles them.
In support of reconsideration of the issue by the incoming
Administration, this Piece is structured as follows. Part I discusses the
compensatory purpose of Title I of the ESEA, explains the importance of
the “supplement not supplant” requirement in preserving the compensatory ideal, acknowledges the difficulty the Department faces in
ascertaining whether a school district intends to spend less local money
on Title I schools in recognition of the federal dollars those schools can
count on receiving, and concludes that the Department’s 2016 proposed
regulation provided a sensible and well-trod solution to that problem.
Part II describes the two important objections leveled against the
proposal by the CRS. Part III responds to those objections, concluding
that both are unpersuasive.
I. TITLE I’S GOAL OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the ESEA into law as a
key part of his War on Poverty.15 The ESEA was the “most far-reaching

13. Feder & Skinner, Proposed Regulations Memo, supra note 12, at 8–9.
14. See Nicole Gorman, Education Department Drops ‘Supplement Not Supplant’
Regulation, Educ. World (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.educationworld.com/a_news/
education-department-drops-controversial-‘supplement-not-supplant’-regulation1979012106 [http://perma.cc/KJK8-WRAP]; see also Title I—Improving the Academic
Achievement of the Disadvantaged—Academic Assessments, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,886 (Dec. 8,
2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 200) (finalizing new Title IA regulations and
omitting previously proposed regulation on “supplement not supplant”).
15. See Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Remarks at the Dedication of the Gary
Job Corps Center, San Marcos, Texas (Apr. 10, 1965), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=26884 [http://perma.cc/5XAH-8HTS] (praising the passage of “a
comprehensive national education bill” as a central contribution to President Johnson’s
War on Poverty).
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and significant education legislation in the history of this country.”16
Title I of the ESEA—the statute’s “crown jewel”—gives school districts
federal dollars to spend on large numbers of low-income students.17
Congress based Title I on two insights: (1) schools with high concentrations of children in poverty need substantially more funding than other
schools to compensate for the negative effects of economic deprivation
on student learning and (2) the federal government has a key role to
play in providing funds to even the playing field for those children.18 For
these reasons, the statute forbids districts to use Title I funds to improve
schools generally and requires that they use the money as direct
assistance to schools serving high concentrations of poor children.19
Subsequent research conclusively validates Title I’s premise that lowincome children concentrated in particular schools require more
resources to achieve the same educational outcomes as their more
privileged counterparts. The famous Coleman Report, published the year
following the ESEA’s adoption, persuasively linked family poverty and
poor educational outcomes, particularly in the context of schools with
concentrations of impoverished children,20 and decades of subsequent
research has confirmed the link.21 Today, nearly all researchers and
policymakers agree that the provision of additional resources to highpoverty schools and students is necessary, if insufficient, to bring their
outcomes up to either the average or an objectively desirable level of
educational attainment.22 Indeed, the weighted funding mechanisms
16. Wash. Research Project & NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Title I of ESEA: Is it
Helping Poor Children?, at i (1969).
17. See John F. (Jack) Jennings, Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise, 81 Phi
Delta Kappan 516, 517 (2000) (describing funding structure of Title I and its central role
in the ESEA).
18. See Wash. Research Project & NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, supra note 16, at iv.
19. See id.
20. See James S. Coleman et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, OE-38001, Equality of
Educational Opportunity 21, 99, 502–04, 523 (1966) (examining and comparing differences in the educational outcomes of students in the United Sates as correlates of
socioeconomic status and race).
21. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class
Schools Through Public School Choice 25 (2003) (citing “fifty years of sociological data”
to conclude that “being born into a poor family places students at risk, but to be assigned
then to a school with a high concentration of poverty poses a second, independent
disadvantage that poor children attending middle-class schools do not face”); George
Farkas & L. Shane Hall, Can Title I Attain Its Goal?, Brookings Papers on Educ. Pol’y,
2000, at 59, 63 (estimating that American low-income children begin first grade a full
instructional year behind middle-class children and finish twelfth grade with skills that, on
average, are at an eighth-grade level); Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic
Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible
Explanations, in Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children’s Life
Chances 91, 94–95 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011).
22. See, e.g., Saba Bireda, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Funding Education Equitably 1
(2011),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/03/pdf/
school_budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/K6Z9-HDMX] (“[S]tudents attending high-poverty
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used in nearly all modern state and local formulas for distributing money
to schools, which multiply a base per-student funding amount by a needbased weighting factor, recognize that to provide adequate funding to
all, more needs to be spent on children living in poverty.23 Title I’s own
formulae for determining the nature and size of federal grants and the
schools eligible to receive them are aimed at precisely these same
poverty-related obstacles.24
A.

The Requirement to Supplement, Not Supplant

Soon after Congress adopted the ESEA, researchers discovered that
Title I was not achieving its compensatory ambition because districts were
using Title I funds in place of, and not in addition to, state and local
funds.25 Instead of providing resources for low-income students beyond
those available to other students, districts were using the money to buy
baseline books and supplies and pay everyday operating costs and salaries
at Title I schools.26 This enabled districts to divert the dollars previously
spent on Title I schools’ basic needs to more privileged schools.27 In
response to these findings, Congress amended the ESEA in 1970 to
require districts to use Title I funds to “supplement and, to the extent
practical, increase the level of funds that would, in the absence of such
Federal funds, be made available [to low-income schools] from nonFederal sources . . . and . . . in no case, to supplant such funds from nonFederal sources.”28
schools actually need more funding to achieve at the level of their wealthier
counterparts.”); see also John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial
Resegregation, High Stakes Testing, and School Inequities: The Case of North Carolina,
81 N.C. L. Rev. 1375, 1440–41 (2003) (linking the resource needs and educational
challenges of North Carolina students both to their individual economic status and to “the
severe effects of poverty concentration” in particular schools).
23. See, e.g., Bruce D. Baker et al., Is School Funding Fair? A National Report Card 6
(4th ed. 2015) (“Student and school poverty correlates with, and is a proxy for, a
multitude of factors that increase the costs of providing equal educational
opportunity . . . .”); see also Kevin Carey, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, State PovertyBased Education Funding: A Survey of Current Programs and Options for Improvement 2
(2002) (referring to recent studies suggesting “the actual additional cost of educating lowincome children is between two and two-and-a-half times the cost of educating non-poor
students”).
24. The Department of Education uses four formulae, based on census poverty data
and the estimated cost of education in each state, to allocate federal funds to districts
under Title I. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 107-110,
§§ 1122–1125A, 115 Stat. 1425, 1515–1524 (2002) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 6332–6337 (2012)).
25. See Wash. Research Project & NAACP LegalDef. & Educ. Fund, supra note 16, at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91230, § 109(a), 84 Stat. 121, 124 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
(emphasis added).
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When Congress adopted these amendments, administrators had
available a simple indicator of the amount of local dollars districts would
have spent on Title I schools “in the absence of Federal funds”: the
amount of local funds spent on those schools as of 1964, just before the
ESEA was passed. A sudden decrease in local dollars for Title I schools
after federal funds became available would have strongly suggested that
the district was unlawfully intending to supplant local with federal
dollars.
Today, however, using historical baselines to estimate the amount of
local funding that districts would provide to low-income schools absent
federal funds is a bad idea. First, historical baselines tend to entrench the
underfunding of public schools and especially high-poverty schools.29
Second, historical baselines are no longer workable. For fifty years since
the ESEA’s adoption, states and districts have supported Title I schools
with combinations of local, state, and federal dollars, to the point that it
is impossible to look backward one, five, or any other number of years to
decide what the pre–Title I historical baseline for local funding might be.
Not surprisingly, therefore, when Congress reauthorized the ESEA last
year in the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), it told the Department to
stop using prior funding levels in deciding whether districts were
“supplanting.”30 It also forbade the Department to assume that supplanting was taking place if districts used Title I funds to provide services
for which local funds were used in other schools.31 Doing so, Congress
found, counterproductively encouraged districts to spend Title I funds
on “pull-out” services provided exclusively and separately to disadvantaged children, depriving them of the benefits of “mainstreaming” with
other children.32 More generally, Congress rejected the various indirect
tests the Department had long used to assess supplanting because they
shed little light on whether districts were allocating funds in keeping with
a forbidden motivation to supplant.
Although the ESSA bans the Department’s prior method of determining whether a district’s funding of Title I schools aims to supplant
29. Cf. Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third
Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1151, 1163–66 (1995) (citing state
court decisions finding historical funding levels insufficient to support an adequate
education, especially for poor children).
30. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1118(b)(3), 129 Stat. 1802,
1875 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (Supp. III))
(rejecting U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Non-Regulatory Guidance, Title I Fiscal Issues 38–39
(rev. ed. Feb. 2008), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/fiscalguid.doc [http://
perma.cc/P6EE-XD92]).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Michael J. Gaffney & Daniel M. Schember, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., The
Effects of The Title I Supplement-Not-Supplant and Excess Costs Provisions on Program
Design Decisions, at xi (1982) (showing that ninety-two percent of districts surveyed used
pull-out mechanisms in their Title I programs); Farkas et al., supra note 20, at 76–77
(noting persistence of pull-out designs triggered by Title I rules).
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local with federal funding, the law retains and actually strengthens the
“supplement not supplant” requirement. For the first time, the law
explicitly requires districts themselves to “demonstrate compliance” with
the nonsupplanting requirement.33 The ESSA, however, does not say how
districts must make that demonstration—leaving the Department to
figure out anew how a district can “demonstrate” that its funding of Title I
schools is not designed to use federal dollars to supplant local spending.
Whether Title I funds are used to supplant local funds is a
motivational question; answering it requires an inquiry into why a
particular school district has spent its local and federal funds as it has. As
we explain below, in the absence of an express congressional stipulation
as to how that question ought to be answered, the Department of
Education’s 2016 proposed regulation quite sensibly embraced the same
objective approach as Congress and other agencies have used for decades
to assess motivational questions in similar contexts.
B.

Established Ways to Assess Motivation

One way to assess an actor’s motivation, such as a motivation to
supplant local funding, is to inquire directly into the actor’s subjective
thoughts and beliefs—as often happens in criminal cases in court.34
When, however, the task of assessing motive is assigned to a federal
agency of limited jurisdiction, and the “actors” in question are local
public servants, this “prosecutorial” sort of inquiry creates a serious risk
of federal overreaching. Additionally, the Department of Education has
over 13,000 school districts to oversee, so the cost of using the
prosecutorial approach would be enormous.35
For similar reasons, Congress and federal agencies often take a
different, more objective, approach to assessing motivation. That approach
begins by asking what the result would be—what the relevant “actor”
would do; what the objective facts would look like—if the actor were
proceeding according to the unlawful motivation. If the actor acts in a
way or achieves a result that is consistent with the forbidden motivation,
the next step is to require the actor to come forward with a different,
33. § 1012(b)(2), 129 Stat. at 1875 (requiring districts to “demonstrate that the
methodology used to allocate State and local funds to each [Title I] school . . . ensures
that such school receives all of the State and local funds it would otherwise receive if it
were not receiving assistance under this part”).
34. See Joel Samaha, Criminal Law 127–29 (11th ed. 2013) (describing fault in
criminal law as generally requiring proof of a subjectively evil or “bad mind”); see also
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 817 (Wis. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 508 U.S. 47
(1993) (distinguishing a Wisconsin criminal statute requiring proof of the “subjective
mental process of selecting a victim because of his protected status” from
antidiscrimination laws, which prohibit “objective acts of discrimination”).
35. See Fast Facts, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/
display.asp?id=372 [http://perma.cc/UDK5-U756] (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (“In 2012–
13, there were about 13,500 [U.S.] public school districts . . . .”).
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legitimate explanation for the steps it took and the results it caused. If it
can do so, it avoids liability.36
Three motivation-dependent federal laws adopted contemporaneously with the 1965 ESEA are administered in exactly this way: Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,37 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967,38 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.39 Under these laws, if
employers or housing officials take actions that result in fewer African
Americans or elderly individuals being hired or promoted or result in the
segregation of Latinos in housing projects different from where Anglo
Americans live, the burden falls on those employers or officials to give a
legitimate reason for their actions that overcomes the implication of
racial, ethnic, or age-biased motivation.40
Consider, for example, a claim alleging that an unlawful motive to
discriminate based on race led to the denial of an African American’s job
application. Recognizing that employers rarely expose direct evidence of
bias, the U.S. Supreme Court and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) take the more objective approach. They allow the
minority job applicant to show, for example, that she was qualified for
the job but was rejected, after which the position remained open.41
36. See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text (discussing the passage of three
motivation-dependent federal laws).
37. Under Title VII, section 703(a)(1), it is an “unlawful employment practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual” because of his or her “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). In administering this law, the U.S.
Supreme Court and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
have adopted the objective approach described in the text for assessing motivation. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2004).
38. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 makes it “unlawful for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). Deferring to an EEOC
regulation, the Supreme Court adopted the objective approach for assessing motivation
under this statute in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235 (2005) (plurality opinion);
id. at 243–47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
39. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent . . . a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.” Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). In Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the Supreme Court—
following a Department of Housing and Urban Development regulation, see
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100)—approved the objective approach to
adjudicating this motivational standard. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–22 (2015).
40. See supra notes 37–39 (quoting statutory provisions requiring actors responsible
for disparities suggesting the possibility of a forbidden discriminatory motive to provide a
nondiscriminatory explanation for their action and its results).
41. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring
applicants showing a prima facie case of discrimination to establish they (i) belong to a
racial minority, (ii) applied and were qualified for a job for which the employer was
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Although this result is not decisive, it is consistent with what would happen
if discrimination had occurred. As such, the Court and the EEOC treat
that behavior as establishing a sufficient reason to ask the employer to
give a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for what happened.42 If
the employer does so, the plaintiff loses unless she can show that the
reason given was a “pretext” for racial bias.43 Federal agencies and courts
use similar approaches to adjudicate age and housing discrimination.44
Importantly, Congress did not itself articulate these objective
frameworks in the underlying laws. Rather, the relevant statutes simply
prohibit actions taken “because of” a prohibited motivation. They say
nothing about how to determine when the relevant motive is present.45
Congress thus left courts and administrative officials to decide how to
answer precisely the kind of motivational question the Department of
Education would face in adjudicating the “supplement not supplant”
requirement.46 And to do so, the courts and administrators in each of
these cases crafted an objective framework for requiring the actor in
question to provide a legitimate explanation for actions and results
mirroring those the forbidden motive is likely to generate.
Suppose the Department wanted to apply this same objective
approach in deciding whether local officials were allocating funds with
the unlawful intention of supplanting local funding for Title I schools
with federal dollars. To use that approach, the Department would first
ask what school districts would do—what objective results they would
trigger—if they intended to spend less money on Title I schools than
otherwise because they knew federal Title I dollars would make up the
difference.
The answer is that the district would probably spend less local
money on one or more Title I schools than it spends, on average, on its
seeking applicants, (iii) were rejected despite being qualified, and (iv) the employer
thereafter continued seeking applicants).
42. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (quoting
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802).
43. Id. at 253.
44. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct at 2516–22 (describing the objective
approach the Court uses to adjudicate discrimination under various statutes).
45. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012) (prohibiting conduct “because of such
individual’s age” (emphasis added)); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012) (making it unlawful to
refuse to sell or rent “because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”
(emphasis added)).
46. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–22 (acknowledging
uncertainty about the appropriate application of the Fair Housing Act’s provision barring
discriminatory actions and following its precedent on parallel provisions in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in rejecting a
subjective test and adopting an objective inquiry); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
428–34 (1970) (addressing as a “question of first impression” whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 imposed “a subjective test of the employer’s intent” and concluding,
based in part on the interpretation of the EEOC, that a more objective test should apply).
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more privileged, non–Title I schools.47 Doing so would enable it to divert
local money from Title I schools to non–Title I schools and use federal
dollars to make up the difference. The fact that one or more Title I
schools receive less in total local funding than do the run of all non–Title
I schools would suggest—not conclusively, but enough to warrant further
inquiry—that the district gives Title I schools fewer local funds because
they are Title I schools. Under the objective approach, the district would
then have to demonstrate a legitimate reason for directing fewer local
dollars, all told, to Title I than to other schools.
C.

The Reasonableness of the Department’s 2016 Proposed Regulation

In fact, the Department’s 2016 proposed regulation would have
operated in exactly this way. Instead of subjecting public officials to a
searching prosecutorial examination of their innermost thoughts, the
proposal asked whether a district was behaving consistently with a
forbidden motive to supplant: whether it provided one or more Title I
schools with less in the way of local funding, all told, than it provided on
average to non–Title I schools.48 If the district were acting in this
manner, the proposed regulation recognized three common situations in
which it would assume that the district nonetheless had a legitimate,
nonsupplanting reason for giving more local funds to non–Title I schools
than to Title I schools: when they had only one elementary, middle, or
high school; when spending disparities between Title I and non–Title I
schools disappeared if funding was considered by grade and not by
school (because some grades cost more than others); or when disparities
disappeared if spending on very small schools (less than 100 students)
was omitted from the calculation.49
If none of these exceptions applied, the 2016 proposal would have
required districts that spent fewer local dollars on Title I than on non–
Title I schools to provide a nonsupplanting explanation for the disparity.50
The Department’s 2016 proposal, that is, invited districts to identify any
“special circumstances related to a particular [non–Title I] school’s
population of disadvantaged students” that justified the district in
spending heavily on that school.51 Any such school would then be
removed from the calculation of the district’s overall funding on its non–
Title I schools.52 If doing so erased the funding disadvantage for Title I
schools, the “supplement not supplant” requirement would be satisfied.53

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

As indeed many school districts do currently. See Heuer & Stullich, supra note 3.
Dep’t of Educ., Issue Paper, supra note 9, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Department thus proposed an entirely familiar and sensible
approach to resolving the difficult motivational question posed by the
“supplement not supplant” requirement—an approach that federal
courts and agencies have used for decades in similar situations.
In fact, the ESSA—Congress’s 2015 reauthorization of the ESEA—
rather clearly invites the Department to use this objective approach. First,
the ESSA for the first time requires districts to collect and publicly report
on exactly how many local, state, and federal dollars—including, explicitly,
dollars devoted to teacher salaries—they spend on each of their schools.54 In
addition, as mentioned earlier, the ESSA for the first time requires
districts to “demonstrate” that their way of allocating local funds is not
designed to use Title I funds to supplant local dollars.55 The ESSA’s first
addition gives the Department everything it needs to take the initial step
in the objective approach: comparing all of the local funding of Title I
and non–Title I schools to see whether the former schools receive fewer
local dollars than the latter ones. The second addition invites the
Department to do exactly what the 2016 regulation proposed: require
districts that act consistently with a motive to supplant by spending less
on Title I schools than on other schools, to “demonstrate” a legitimate,
educationally sound reason for spending local funds as they do.
To be sure, it is possible to improve upon the Department’s 2016
proposal. First, exceptions should be added for other common, educationally sound reasons for directing fewer local dollars to Title I than to
other schools—e.g., unpredictable emergencies associated with floods,
fire, and the like. Additionally, the Department should broaden the
definition of acceptable reasons for funding non–Title I schools more
richly than Title I schools. The definition in the 2016 proposal encompassed any policy that serves the needs of disadvantaged students in non–
Title I schools.56 The Department might additionally have credited policies
that equally serve important educational or learning needs of all of the
district’s school children in ways that cannot be accomplished as well or
better without spending more money on non–Title I than on Title I
schools.57 If, for example, a non–Title I school is shown to be the least
expensive location for equipment needed to expand internet access to all
54. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1111(h)(1)(C)(x), 129 Stat.
1802, 1849 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (Supp. III)
(requiring districts to report “per-pupil expenditures of Federal, State, and local funds,
including actual personnel expenditures and actual nonpersonnel expenditures of Federal,
State, and local funds, disaggregated by source of funds, for . . . each school . . . for the
preceding fiscal year” (emphasis added)).
55. Id. §§ 1012, 1118(b)(1), 129 Stat. at 1875.
56. Dep’t of Educ., Issue Paper, supra note 9, at 6.
57. This “less restrictive means” approach mirrors established Title VII doctrine,
under which an explanation proffered by a defendant for using an employment test with a
disparate negative effect on racial minorities may be rejected if “other tests or selection
devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s
legitimate interest.” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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of a district’s schools, that would legitimately explain the disproportionate funding to the district’s non–Title I schools. On the other hand, a
policy of retaining effective teachers by paying them extra or letting
them opt to work in non–Title I rather than Title I schools should not
suffice. The benefits of that policy would not be equally available to all
students in the district, and the objective could as easily be accomplished
by giving effective teachers extra compensation for working in schools
that currently have no or few experienced or effective teachers.
There thus are three good reasons for the approach taken in the
Department’s 2016 proposed regulation: (1) application of a comparatively nonintrusive objective test that avoids the many problems with a
prosecutorial inquiry into the subjective motivations of officials responsible for allocating funds in thousands of districts nationwide,58 (2) the
clear precedents for the objective approach in federal courts’ and
agencies’ implementation of laws adopted at the same time as the
ESEA,59 and (3) the ESSA’s invitation to adopt the objective approach.60
Certainly, the contrary, prosecutorial approach is not obviously more
reasonable or unambiguously required by the statute’s plain meaning.
Under these circumstances, there would be every reason to defer to the
interpretation offered by the Department in 2016 of a statute the
Department has been responsible for interpreting and administering for
decades.61
II. CRS OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED REGULATION
Without mentioning the longstanding precedents and statutory invitation for the Department’s objective approach, a CRS Report offered two
objections to the proposed 2016 regulation.62 These objections deserve
close consideration given the nonpartisan CRS’s reputation for high-quality
analysis and the objections’ likely impact on the Obama Administration’s
decision not to finalize its proposed regulation.
The CRS, an arm of the Library of Congress, provides research and
analysis on request by members of Congress in aid of the legislative
process.63 Bound by “requirements for confidentiality, timeliness, accu-

58. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (explaining why a subjective test
for assessing the motivation for government action is undesirable).
59. See supra notes 36–46 and accompanying text (discussing the objective approach
to assessing motivation adopted by analogous federal statutory schemes).
60. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (arguing the ESSA invites an
objective approach to assessing motivation).
61. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(describing the circumstances in which Congress should defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
62. See Feder & Skinner, Proposed Regulations Memo, supra note 12, at 8–9.
63. See About CRS, Library Cong., http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/ [http://
perma.cc/ZZR7-VURF] (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).
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racy, objectivity, balance, and nonpartisanship,”64 the CRS is respected
on both sides of the aisle in both houses of Congress for providing
members with rigorous analysis across the full spectrum of public policy
questions.65 On issues like the one under consideration here, on which
most of the available policy analysis is generated by partisan interests,66
the CRS often provides the only objective analysis of the issue at hand.
In addressing the Department’s proposed “supplement not supplant”
regulation, the CRS raised two objections—both matters of law as well as
policy. First, the CRS suggested that the proposal ran afoul of a provision
in the ESEA forbidding the Department to force districts to equalize perpupil spending (the “equalization objection”).67 According to the CRS, a
reviewing court would likely hold that the proposed regulation, which
would “require Title I-A per-pupil expenditures to meet or exceed those
of non–Title-I-A schools,” exceeds the Department of Education’s
rulemaking authority.68
The CRS also contended that the proposal violated a caveat in the
ESEA’s longstanding “comparability of services” rule.69 At the same time
as Congress adopted the “supplement not supplant” rule governing the
“level of [local] funds” districts provide to Title I schools, it also required
school districts accepting federal support to provide comparable
“services” to Title I and non–Title I schools.70 To comply with this
requirement, districts must show that they have a district-wide salary
schedule and that their policies ensure equivalent per-pupil numbers of
teachers, administrators, and supplies across schools.71 The law then adds
an important caveat: The fact that some teachers make more than others
based on seniority may not be considered in deciding whether there is
per-pupil equivalence of services across schools.72 In other words, if one

64. Ida A. Brudnick, Cong. Research Serv., RL33471, The Congressional Research
Service and the American Legislative Process 2 (Apr. 12, 2011), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL33471.pdf [http://perma.cc/29NU-AE2C] (describing the CRS’s functions).
65. See 160 Cong. Rec. E1192 (daily ed. July 17, 2014) (extension of remarks of Hon.
Larson) (honoring the CRS on its hundredth anniversary). But cf. Matthew R. Auer &
Michael Cox, Appraising Climate Change Information Reported to Congress, 2 Int’l J.
Climate Change Strategies & Mgmt. 118, 118 (2010) (noting the CRS “cites its own past
publications more often than it cites peer-reviewed scholarship”).
66. See, e.g., Ujifusa, supra note 10 (describing research recently presented by civil
rights advocacy groups on the “supplement not supplant” issue).
67. See 20 U.S.C. § 6576 (2012) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
mandate equalized spending per pupil for a State, [district], or school.”).
68. Feder & Skinner, Proposed Regulations Memo, supra note 12, at 8.
69. See id. at 4–5.
70. Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230,
§ 109(a), 84 Stat. 121, 124 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)(emphasis
added).
71. Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 1118(c)(2)(A), 20 U.S.C.
§ 6321(c)(2)(A).
72. Id. § 6321(c)(2)(B).
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school has ten rookie teachers and 300 students, and another school has
ten much higher-paid long-term veterans for 300 students, the two
schools are deemed to have “comparable” instructional services. The
CRS concluded that, because Congress intended to retain the experiencebased staff salary exception from the comparability of services, omitting
the same exception from the proposed regulation constituted an unlawful attempt to require districts to include actual teacher salaries in their
“supplement not supplant” calculations.73
As we develop below, the CRS’s analysis in regard to both objections
is faulty as a matter of both law and policy. Neither objection engages
effectively with the express requirements and purposes of Title I and its
“supplement not supplant” and “comparability of services” provisions,
with well-established approaches to the problem of assessing the
motivations of state and local public officials, or with accepted rules of
statutory construction.
III. RESPONSES TO THE OBJECTIONS
The CRS’s equalization objection is particularly puzzling because the
proposed regulation plainly does not require equalized funding.
Consistent with Title I’s fundamental premise, the regulation assumes
that Title I schools typically should receive more local, state, and federal
funding per pupil than the average received by non–Title I schools74—the
opposite of requiring equal per-pupil expenditures for each school
considered separately. Additionally, through its three exceptions and its
catch-all invitation, the proposed regulation recognizes many educationally sound reasons why non–Title I schools may receive more funding
per student than Title I schools—and why individual Title I and non–
Title I schools will receive different amounts of per-pupil funding than
other schools in their own category.75 The proposed regulation thus is no
more a requirement of “equalization” than the Civil Rights Act of 1964
or the Age Discrimination Act is a requirement that all employers have a
race- or age-balanced workforce.76 Like those precedents, the proposed
regulation allows unequal outcomes whenever there is a legitimate
reason for them.
The “comparability of services” objection is more serious but also
fails. As the CRS acknowledged,77 if the caveat excluding teacher salaries
and seniority is applied not only to the distribution of “services” (the sole
73. Feder & Skinner, Proposed Regulations Memo, supra note 12, at 9.
74. Dep’t of Educ., Issue Paper, supra note 9, at 5.
75. Id. at 5–6.
76. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
77. See Feder & Skinner, Proposed Regulations Memo, supra note 12, at 5 (noting
“disparities in personnel expenditures between Title I-A schools and non–Title I-A
schools” that are obscured when teacher salaries are omitted from calculations of local
spending on schools).

50

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 117:36

focus of the comparability rule), but also to the distribution of “funds”
(the subject of the distinct, “supplement not supplant” rule), districts
could systematically assign their most experienced, most expensive
teachers to non–Title I Schools and thus spend far less on instruction at
Title I than at non–Title I schools. Doing so would directly contradict
Title I’s recognition that low-income schools need more funds for
instruction. Even so, the CRS suggested that, without ever saying so,
Congress intended the treatment of teacher salaries it wrote into the
“comparability” rule to apply as well to the “supplement not supplant”
rule.78
This interpretation is flawed. The “comparability” and “supplement
not supplant” provisions are distinct, and they must be interpreted as
distinct. As their words plainly signify, comparability applies only to the
distribution of “services”;79 “supplement not supplant” applies only to
the expenditure of “funds.”80 That distinction must be given operative
significance, or each provision would render the other superfluous—
violating a well-established rule against interpreting statutes to contain
redundancies or superfluous provisions.81
Congress itself has always treated the two rules distinctly. It limits the
comparability rule to service differentials other than those tied to
differences in teacher seniority but has never applied a parallel caveat to
78. Id. at 9 (arguing “a reviewing court could view [the] legislative history” with
respect to the comparability of services “as relevant evidence of congressional intent to
maintain current statutory requirements related to comparability determinations,”
including “via other methods”).
79. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides:
[A] local educational agency may receive funds under this part only if State and
local funds will be used in schools served under this part to provide services that,
taken as a whole, are at least comparable to services in schools that are not
receiving funds under this part . . . .
....
. . . [I]n the determination of expenditures per pupil from State and local
funds, or instructional salaries per pupil from State and local funds, staff salary
differentials for years of employment shall not be included in such
determinations.
§ 1118(c), 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
80. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides:
A State educational agency or local educational agency shall use Federal funds
received under this part only to supplement the funds that would, in the absence
of such Federal funds, be made available from State and local sources for the
education of students participating in programs assisted under this part, and not
to supplant such funds.
Id. § 1118(b)(1), 20 U.S.C. § 6321(b)(1) (emphasis added).
81. E.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (requiring statutes to be construed
“so that effect is given to all its provisions [and] no part will be inoperative or superfluous”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000))); see also Caleb Nelson, What Is
Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 355 (2005) (discussing the “presumption against
surplusage”).
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the “supplement not supplant” rule.82 By reading into the statute a
requirement Congress added in one place but left out of another, the
CRS violated another established rule of statutory interpretation: that
Congress is assumed to have intended “the exclusion of language from
one statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the same
statute.”83
Congress has perfectly sensible—indeed, compelling—reasons for
treating the distribution of services and funds differently in regard to
teacher seniority and salaries. Absent the “teacher seniority” caveat, the
requirement of comparable teacher services might be thought to depend
on the quality of each individual teacher providing services. If that were
so, the comparability provision would require districts to rate each
teacher to identify how much “value added” each provides and then use
the aggregate of all teachers’ “value added” to see if different schools get
less or more. Under these circumstances, Congress had three good
reasons not to use teacher seniority or salary as a proxy for teacher
quality: Doing so is: inaccurate;84 administratively burdensome, given the
many millions of teachers nationwide whom districts would have to rate
individually; and demoralizing to teachers, some of whom districts would
have to declare less worthy than others. The simple solution is the one
the ESEA’s comparability provision has long used: Treat each teacher as
equal to all others by defining comparability of services in terms of
pupil–teacher ratios and district-wide salary schedules.
The “supplement not supplant” rule is very different. It applies to
something classically and inherently fungible: money. Because each
dollar actually spent is no different from or more administratively
burdensome to track than any other dollar, no matter what the dollar
pays for, there is no reason for districts not to count every dollar spent on
each of its schools, including dollars spent on teachers—which is exactly
what the new Act requires districts to do and to report publicly.85 Indeed,
it is the CRS proposal to treat money spent on teachers differently from
82. See the differences in the wording of the rules as emphasized in supra notes 79–
80 and accompanying text.
83. E.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006); see Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (reasoning Congress must be assumed to have acted
“intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.
1972))).
84. See, e.g., Donald Boyd et al., The Narrowing Gap in New York City Teacher
Qualifications and Its Implications for Student Achievement in High-Poverty Schools, 27 J.
Pol’y Analysis Mgmt. 793, 808–10 (2008) (finding teacher experience levels are not well
correlated with teacher effectiveness as measured by student learning); Steven G. Rivkin et
al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 Econometrica 417, 419, 449 (2005)
(noting “there is little evidence that improvements [in teacher effectiveness] continue
after the first three years” and concluding “experience is not significantly related to
achievement following the initial years in the profession”).
85. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(x) (Supp. III 2015).
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money spent on everything else that resurrects all the problems Congress
aimed to avoid through the “comparability of services” caveat: Its
proposal is inaccurate (treating schools that spend vastly different
amounts as if they spend the same), administratively burdensome
(requiring the Department to segregate and track different types of
dollars), and demeaning (to disadvantaged children on whom the CRS
interpretation lets districts spend less).
It is thus entirely consistent for Congress to treat each teacher the
same when talking about services and each dollar the same when talking
about spending. And it makes perfect sense for the Department to use the
spending data that Congress now requires districts to make public—in
reports that must treat dollars spent on teachers the same as dollars spent
on everything else—when applying the “supplement not supplant” rule.
The most distressing aspect of the CRS’s position is that it leaves the
Department with no viable way to determine whether districts intend to
supplant local with federal dollars. According to the CRS, the reauthorization law neither “establish[es]”—nor, in its analysis, does it allow—
“any type of standard or requirement regarding how to demonstrate that
a Title I-A school receives all of the state and local funds it would have
received in the absence of Title I-A funds.”86 In other words, the CRS’s
untenable conclusion is that the law forbidding districts to supplant local
funds with federal dollars is unenforceable—even though the reauthorization law both retains and strengthens the “supplement not supplant”
rule.
The CRS’s analysis falls short because it mistakes the statute’s silence
on the Department’s proposed test for the test’s prohibition. But as the
Supreme Court has held in regard to the Education Secretary’s
rulemaking authority, “if Congress left a ‘gap’ for the agency to fill—
then we must uphold the Secretary’s interpretation as long as it is
reasonable.”87 And as this Piece has shown, faced at once with congressional silence on the applicable “supplanting” standard and with the
crippling intractability of possible alternatives, the objective approach
taken by the Department’s 2016 proposed regulation is both reasonable
and consistent with respected judicial and administrative precedents.88

86. Feder & Skinner, Proposed Regulations Memo, supra note 12, at 4. The CRS
Report does not defend the only alternative to the Department’s objective test, under
which the Department would inquire into the subjective beliefs and bona fides of
thousands of local officials.
87. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007); see Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A] court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.”).
88. Tellingly, the CRS Report omitted a third objection to the Department’s proposed
regulation: that the regulation violated the ESSA’s prohibition on any prescription of a
specific methodology for allocating funds among Title I and non–Title I schools. See Press
Release, Senator Lamar Alexander, Administration’s ‘Supplement Not Supplant’ Regulation
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CONCLUSION
It is well established that children from low-income families need
more funds to succeed in schools than their more privileged counterparts.89 Working from this premise, Congress designed Title I to provide
compensatory funds to poor children. Since then, in the face of various
attempts to undermine this goal, amendments to Title I have stood by
this core principle, including by insisting that districts use Title I funds to
supplement, not supplant, local funds for disadvantaged children.
Today, poor children face yet another threat to Title I’s compensatory purpose: efforts to read the caveat barring the counting of teacher
salaries for purposes of “comparability of services” into the rule requiring
districts to supplement not supplant local with federal funds”—even
though Congress has omitted that caveat from the “supplement not
supplant” requirement for fifty years. Relying on this unpersuasive interpretation, and exploiting the difficulty of proving a subjective motivation
to underspend on Title I schools, some districts seek to exclude from
“supplement not supplant” consideration the many millions of dollars
they spend on the salaries of their most effective and experienced
teachers, who are disproportionately deployed to economically privileged
non–Title I schools. If allowed to persist, this stratagem will continue
providing many fewer local dollars to Title I schools than to other
schools, in direct violation of Title I’s compensatory purpose.
To preserve Title I’s compensatory purpose, the Department of
Education in 2016 crafted a reasonable proposed regulation, which used
a long-established and well-respected method of identifying actions taken
pursuant to an unlawful motivation—in this case, a motivation to
supplant local with federal funds. It is unsurprising that the regulation
came under fire from partisan constituencies aiming to preserve the local
funds districts have been diverting to economically advantaged schools by
concentrating their most experienced and effective teachers there and
not counting the extra dollars they spend on those teachers. It is
surprising, however—and regrettable—that the nonpartisan CRS lent
consequential aid and comfort to this effort through poor legal
reasoning—reasoning the Obama administration likely considered when
abandoning this important proposal.

“Raises Grave Questions About What to Expect from Future Regulations” (May 18, 2016),
http://www.alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=44D1CEFF-06D940A6-8124-07275D8B319F [http://perma.cc/VAM5-HJD2]. As the CRS evidently concluded, steps by the Department to forbid a particular allocative methodology—one that
uses federal dollars to supplant local funding—are precisely what the statute’s
“supplement not supplant” provision requires and are not the same thing as prescribing
any other particular methodology.
89. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

